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Introduction 
Daewoo Corporation, which means the 'whole world' in Korean, is South Korea's third 
largest chaebol, a close-knit web of companies cemented by equity ties, investments, and 
tight business relationships. Founded by Kim Woo Chong in the late 1960's, Daewoo is 
involved in such diverse activity as shipbuilding, consumer electronics, computers, 
construction equipment, and automobiles. Estimated consolidated sales for 1997 stood at 
$49 billion. 
With support from the South Korean government and with stiff competition in their home 
market, Daewoo and the other chaebols began to aggressively pursue overseas expansion 
during the 1970's and 1980's. Daewoo Motor Company (DMC) has been an integral part 
of this 'segyewha', or globalization. DMC's goal is to be a top 10 global automobile 
manufacturer. In 1997, DMC was the fastest growing car manufacturer and achieved a 
20% gain in total units sold (refer to Exhibit 1). 
In order to become a global player and to achieve rapid sales growth, DMC chose the 
developing economies of Central & Eastern Europe to serve as their manufacturing base 
for local consumption and for export to the European Union. As of early this year, 
Daewoo Motor Company has pledged roughly $6 billion in regional investment with 
planned automobile manufacturing capacity of 1.25 million units (refer to Exhibit 2). 
Even with the ongoing financial crisis in Korea and in the rest of Southeast Asia, DMC 
continues to pledge massive investments in the developing economies of Central & 
Eastern Europe. "Daewoo will overcome the crisis through expansionist measures. We 
cannot embrace the future if we flinch at a time of recession", wrote Chairman Kim in a 
company newsletter. But his plan may risk corporate suicide. 
With a parent company 'at risk of bankruptcy' according to SBC Warburg Dillon Read, 
how is DMC securing the necessary capital to fund their aggressive strategies in Central 
& Eastern Europe? What financing structures is Daewoo implementing in order to 
minimize financial and operating exposures and the cost of capital? Lastly, what does the 
future hold for Daewoo? 
This paper will attempt to develop hypotheses addressing these questions. It is important 
to recognize that the Korean chaebols lack transparency in reporting financial data. 
While the chaebols are committed to following international accounting standards by the 
year 2000, until then researchers must rely on secondary research and 'loosely' reported 
numbers from which to develop hypotheses. 
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DAEWOO. THE CHAEBOLS, AND THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
A detailed discussion of the Korean chaebols and the Korean economic crisis is beyond 
the scope of this study; however, to understand DMC's overall corporate strategy and 
their capital procurement techniques, it is important to gain an appreciation for the 
development and structure of the chaebols and the current tight credit environment in 
South Korea. 
The Emergence of Chaebols 
Frequently in developing economies large conglomerates emerge in order to develop 
broad product supply and delivery capabilities, to educate and train their labor force, and 
to build important relationships with the government. To support South Korea's 
economic growth and recovery following the Korean War, the government encouraged 
the development of chaebols. 
The growth in chaebols was fueled by state 'policy loans' provided during the period of 
military dictatorships up until 1987.1 By having subsidized loans for targeted industry 
sectors, the chaebols were able to focus on sales growth instead of profits. There was no 
immediate concern for profitability or for the long-term attractiveness of particular 
sectors. With the chaebols wielding increasing influence in multiple industries, Korean 
banks could be easily influenced and practice loose credit control.2 
Chaebol foreign investment sharply rose in 1992 when the government relaxed 
restrictions on overseas financing. In Korea at the time, the chaebols had faced a shortage 
of credit but were now able to access a large source of cheap foreign funds. Korean debt 
increased from $48.4 billion in June 1994 to $70.2 billion in June 1995 as the chaebols 
pledged investments throughout the world.3 
The use of subsidized credit enables a firm to enter into marginal NPV projects. While 
this may still provide positive returns to shareholders, controls in disciplined expansion 
are reduced in importance. The long-term effect, as witnessed today in Korea, is that 
large firms will have non-producing assets and operations in non-core businesses. For 
example, this is witnessed with Samsung's brand new facility for the production of 
automobiles in the already over-saturated Korean market. 
Government Controls 
In 1995 the Korean government took steps to slow chaebol over-expansion (the top four 
chaebols had pledged $20 billion in foreign investments) and to curb their reliance on 
1 "Radical Korean Investment", Business Central Europe. May 1, 1997 
2 "Face Value", The Economist. February 8, 1997 
3 Burton, John, The Financial Times. October 12, 1995 
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debt financing. Bureaucrats worried that if these foreign investments failed the 
government would be responsible for bailing the chaebols out.4 Additionally, the 
government feared a transfer of production outside Korea, which ironically they had 
originally encouraged, which could lead to a decline in local investment in key industries 
and hurt domestic growth. 
In October 1995 the government imposed international capital financing constraints by 
requiring all investments greater than $100 million to obtain 20% of the capital from 
within Korea - through retained earnings, the local stock market, and/or government 
controlled banks. Since interest rates in Korea were high (12%) compared to elsewhere, 
this increased a firm's borrowing costs and in theory would limit expansion.5 By 
increasing costs and making projects with modest returns unprofitable, the government 
hoped to reduce 'segyewha'. 
This step was intended to enforce discipline, boost the local equity market, prevent over-
leveraged chaebols from further increasing their debt burden, and end risky investment 
projects overseas. Additionally, the government hoped to regain a degree of control over 
the chaebols. Daewoo was expected to have the most difficulty with these regulations 
given their aggressive expansion plans; however, Daewoo viewed these constraints as an 
opportunity to solidify their international gains against their chaebol rivals. "Every crisis 
creates opportunities", says Chairman Kim.6 
The 1997 Crisis 
These governmental controls were not able to avert the Korean debt crisis of 1997. With 
easy credit available to fuel the conglomerates' global expansion, the chaebols amassed 
massive amounts of debt - the average debt to equity ratio for the top 30 chaebols is 
300%. Additionally, the local banks developed a portfolio consisting of 30% non-
performing loans.7 This is not surprising considering Korean banks continued to lend to 
the now bankrupt Hanbo, a large chaebol, even when its debt was 20 times equity. 
In the first ten months of 1997, ten major chaebols went bankrupt leaving banks with an 
incredible $27 billion in bad debt. By the end of 1998, South Korea is projected to have 
$223 billion in debt and with currency depreciation this will be pushed to 69% of GDP.8 
Although limited in specifics, recent financial data and applicable financial ratios for 
DMC are provided in Exhibits 3A, 3B, & 3C. In review of this data, the most startling 
aspect is the massive ramp up in both scale of operations and debt during one year. Total 
4 Burton, John, The Financial Times. October 12, 1995 
5 Narkani, Laxmi, Business Week. October 30, 1995 
6 Kraar, Louis, Fortune. January 12, 1998 
7 "Radical Korean Investment", Business Central Europe. May 1, 1997 
8 The EIU Country Reports - South Korea. 1st Quarter 1998 
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liabilities increased by over 1500% from 1995 to 1996 while total assets over the same 
period increased by 2600%. Total liabilities are 12 times shareholders equity and the debt 
ratio stands at 90% of assets. The creative, and risky, methods Daewoo employs to 
access capital to fuel their expansion are discussed later. 
Like many of the other chaebols, Daewoo is criticized for relying on outside money too 
often. The consolidated group's debt to equity is about 300%, but this does not include 
the off-balance sheet guarantees of its overseas subsidiaries' debt. In 1996, guaranteed 
subsidiary debt was valued at $17 billion.9 Daewoo Corporation's combined long and 
short-term debt increased 20% in 1995 to $5.8 billion. Interest payments of $726.9 
million surpassed operating income. In fact, Daewoo Corporation was able to report a net 
profit of $77.8 million because it had $159 million of interest income. These debt 
numbers look even worse when the subsidiary information is included. 
In the environment leading up to and during the Korean economic crisis, Daewoo was 
thought to be in trouble; however, with creative financing techniques to be later 
described, DMC is able to spread anticipated investment costs over longer periods of 
time. While this technique insulates them from the near term cash shortage due to plant 
modernization, this of course does not mitigate investment risks. 
DMC INVESTMENT ACTIVITY AND STRATEGY IN CENTRAL & EASTERN 
EUROPE 
Daewoo Corporation's investments in the region total more than $15 billion with 
activities ranging from construction to shipyards to consumer electronics.10 Daewoo 
Motor Company produces vehicles in five countries. While some countries of Central & 
Eastern Europe have enjoyed rapid growth in GDP and in vehicle sales, there are hard 
questions being asked about Daewoo's long term viability: expansion in the region is 
generally a high risk proposition, particularly given the expanding automobile production 
capacity in the region and the requisite need for increasing consumer purchasing power. 
Rationale for Entry 
Automobile manufacturers are locating in the region in order to sell to the developing 
local markets and to develop a low-cost production base for export to the European 
Union. While established multinational automobile manufacturers are constrained in 
shifting production to the east due to existing over-capacity and restrictive labor union 
contracts in Western Europe, manufacturers locating production in the region enjoy: 
* Locally sourced, low cost components 
• Low wage rates which are approximately 10% of Germany 
9 Schuman, Michael, The Asian Wall Street Journal. May 22, 1996 
10 Brzgewski, Matthew, The Wall Street Journal. May 7, 1997 
University of Michigan Business School 7 
Daewoo Motor Company 
• Subsidized government loans 
• Tax holidays 
• Transfer pricing flexibility 
• A laboratory for production and labor practice experimentation 
To become a top 10 automobile manufacturer, Daewoo recognized the importance of 
locating in emerging markets with limited existing competition. Daewoo has specific 
investment criteria that must be satisfied before investing in an emerging market:11 
• sufficient population to underpin a growing consumer base 
• political leadership dedicated to national economic development 
• diligent work force 
• proximity to a major regional market 
Investment Risks 
Should a country meet the above criteria, Daewoo then follows a strategy of acquiring or 
entering into alliances with state-owned car manufacturers. This first mover advantage 
provides an inherited dealer and repair network, access to an established supplier base, 
and an immediate massive potential for economies of scale. While these are important 
advantages, Daewoo has encountered high variability in dealership quality, significant 
inefficiencies in production, and culture clashes with the existing workforce. 
The local acquisition strategy has additional risks. These existing plants have substantial 
capacity that is not being utilized because of limited current sales potential- as in 
Romania and Uzbekistan. To be sure, under-utilization of existing assets is also due to 
factory upgrades and product line extensions; however, from an accounting standpoint 
Daewoo still must depreciate the assets without offsetting them against revenue gains. 
Another risk is the difficulty in educating and integrating local workers in the Korean 
work approach and ethic. This problem is further compounded by labor contract 
negotiations. Daewoo signs an initial labor contract guaranteeing local employment, but 
this usually expires after three years of signing. During renegotiations and the inevitable 
layoffs, the political fallout and negatively impacted morale could hurt not only 
production, but also sales. 
An additional risk to DMC's massive investments is the economic and political risk of 
the host country. DMC's viability is directly linked to the economic reforms and stability 
of the country/region. For instance, Romanian currency devaluation led to a decline in 
local car sales and left Daewoo with a large inventory of unsold cars.12 Daewoo 
Lee, Charles "Tomorrow the World", Far Eastern Economic Review, 5/1/97 
Burton, John, Financial Times. 10/6/97 
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Debt Markets 
(Syndicated Loans, Equity Linked Bonds, Depository Receipts) 
60% 
JV Partner, 
Host Gov., or 
Local Bank 
18% 





Source: Daewoo Financing Presentation 
Daewoo & Sister Companies 
As noted earlier, chaebol subsidiaries assist their sister companies in providing 
investment financing. With the Korean international funding constraints, a significant 
portion of financing comes from within the firm. Through cross-subsidiary loans and 
equity investments, Daewoo companies are heavy lenders to each other. This technique 
reduces the cost of capital for the project, but increases the risk within the firm. 
There are obvious agency problems associated with this method and a dangerous 
extension of financial exposure within the corporation and to outside lenders. A 
subsidiary or an outside bank, underwriting debt for a Daewoo company in a particular 
industry, may in fact be exposed to the business risk of a sister company given 
outstanding guarantees on sister subsidiary debt. 
Host Governments 
Daewoo is able to take a flexible, far reaching approach to negotiating acquisitions of 
state-owned firms because of Daewoo's broad industry investments and due to 
governments' need for cash. "The firm's throw caution to the wind policy of getting in 
early, investing in unrelated projects in a big way, and promising to stay around for the 
long term scores well with local cash strapped governments."15 This approach enables 
DMC to beat out their competitors when bidding (like overtaking General Motors with 
FSO) "because governments find the company's pledges to invest in all sorts of deals 
ranging from cars to telecommunications too tempting", says an analyst at DRI/McGraw-
Hill. 
Local officials, who are grateful for the job creation (or more likely short term 
employment continuation) and the needed investment, are then willing to supply Daewoo 
Brzgewski, Matthew, The Wall Street Journal. May 7, 1997 
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with favorable trade terms, protection against competition via import duties, soft credits 
from state banks, and generous tax exemptions.16 This can be seen with Daewoo's 
investment in Uzbekistan: they enjoy a five year tax holiday, a 50% import duty on 
competitors cars, and as an added benefit, owners of Daewoo vehicles are not required to 
pay highway tolls.17 
To be sure, the global automobile manufacturers secure tax holidays that most likely 
match DMC. Yet it is the breadth and scale of Daewoo Corporation's investments that 
enable them to achieve greater bargaining power with host governments. This frequently 
results in firm-specific protection and loan/import subsidies. 
Local Banks 
After initial capitalization, the local operating company becomes responsible for raising 
its own finances. To assist in achieving this goal, Daewoo has been aggressively targeting 
bank acquisitions through their subsidiary Daewoo Securities. In 1997, this subsidiary 
was negotiating to buy uanks in Poland and Bulgaria, and considering banks in Croatia, 
Ukraine, and Azerbaijan.18 
The importance of owned local banks is two-fold. First, and not unlike other auto 
manufacturers, Daewoo requires local banks to provide consumer lending products to 
drive DMC sales growth. Yet the Daewoo bank does not truly operate at an arms length 
from the auto company. So while this may assist volume sales growth for the automobile 
company, the pressure to provide loans may cause an unprofitable, risky loan portfolio for 
the bank. Second, the firm requires Daewoo owned local financing institutions to feed 
cash to Daewoo's operations. This activity, not practiced by western automobile 
producers, may contribute to keeping a losing firm alive. 
This local financing structure propagates the problematic financing techniques of South 
Korea. An agency problem is introduced by the parent company owning both the lending 
and borrowing institutions. As seen with cross-subsidiary lending, low cost loans are 
encouraged to be provided to a sister company for possible negative NPV projects. This 
increases the probability that the loan will be non-performing. Furthermore, to fuel the 
sales of the sister firm, the same lending institution provides consumer-financing loans 
with potentially relaxed credit criteria. This circle of loose lending drastically magnifies 
the parent's and outside lenders' exposure to financial risk. 
Brzgewski, Matthew, The Wall Street Journal. May 7, 1997 
"Radical Korean Investment", Business Central Europe. May 1, 1997 
"Cash Cows", Business Central Europe. May 1, 1997 
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The Impact 
It is evident that much of Daewoo's expansion into Central & Eastern Europe is funded 
either directly or indirectly by debt. This leaves the firm dangerously exposed to a cash 
crunch should something go wrong in their host countries. Even with Poland, Hungary, 
and Czech Republic ascension into NATO, security and political stability in the region is 
not guaranteed. Furthermore, while some countries in the region have enjoyed fast GDP 
growth, countries like Romania, Russia, Uzbekistan, and the Ukraine are certainly far 
from prosperous and continue to struggle with privatization and free market reforms. 
Since Daewoo's foreign investments are risky, debt markets will demand a higher interest 
rate and will provide less capital. With no cash cow in Daewoo's portfolio of companies, 
in the event of a financial emergency the firm would have to borrow more leaving banks 
to decide its fate. Additionally, with Daewoo funding their expansion through debt and 
sometimes new equity rather than stable cash flows, the firm's earnings will be depressed 
and long term narrow profit margins will result. 
A VIEW TOWARDS THE FUTURE 
Because of their relative weakness against foreign competition, Daewoo has made 
aggressive high risk/high reward bets in uncertain emerging markets. In continuing their 
belief that moving quickly and boldly will strengthen their long term position, Daewoo is 
practicing the same strategic and financial formula in Central & Eastern Europe as they 
once did in Korea: rapid growth, broad industry investment, use of government tax and 
investment subsidies, and cross-subsidiary lending. 
By following a strategy of 'fast and furious', Daewoo encourages limited investment 
discipline. Daewoo believes they are in a stronger position than the popular press 
indicates since their pledged investments are allocated over a five to ten year period. 
While this reduces their immediate need for financing, their statements do not provide an 
indication on the underlying value and risk of their investments. In fact, DMC's local 
acquisitions require massive modernization of the product line and the production and 
distribution capabilities. Furthermore, DMC is relying on a huge expansion of consumer 
demand in Central Europe to provide necessary cash flow - an important element beyond 
management control. 
An additional threat to DMC's competitive position is the continuing global over-
expansion in automobile production capacity. In a recent Coopers & Lybrand study, by 
2002 the industry will build 20 million more cars than demanded globally (two million in 
over-capacity in Korea).19 In addition to the macro-economic threats to DMC's regional 
investments, over-capacity could further constrain future cash flows. 
Feast, Robert, Automotive Industries. 9/1/97 
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Required Reforms for Daewoo Corporation 
Daewoo must end mutual debt guarantees by subsidiaries. This practice encourages 
cross-subsidization of subsidiary projects and can lead to investment in negative NPV 
projects. Perhaps even more dangerous is the potential for a 'domino effect': one poor 
performing business unit unable to pay internal interest payments which in turn could 
constrain sister companies ability to make requisite interest payments leading to the 
eventual financial distress of the entire chaebol. 
Daewoo must implement international accounting standards in order to achieve 
transparency. Instead of gaining preferential government treatment through such tools as 
subsidized loans and duty protection, Daewoo must be more open to market evaluation. 
Through this external 'check', Daewoo will be forced to implement the proper internal 
controls and incentive systems to assure positive contributions to shareholder/stakeholder 
value. 
Related to the above two suggestions, Daewoo should shed non-performing assets and 
spin-off marginal activities. This will improve Daewoo's balance sheet by reducing the 
heavy debt load and by providing an improved corporate focus. 
In fact, these suggestions gained chaebol agreement in January during discussions with 
the International Monetary Fund. Daewoo agreed to commence reforms with the 
intention of improving their business methodologies by early next century. Additionally, 
DMC is in negotiations with General Motors to receive an equity infusion of cash. While 
Daewoo may share production facilities and provide GM with an entry into their home 
market, this will provide relief from any cash flow problems and assist in influencing 
internal reforms. 
Daewoo Motor Company will remain in a precarious situation for the near and medium 
term. Because they are heavily invested in developing economies, they will struggle to 
generate cash flow to pay off their debt burden. This operating environment demands 
corporate structural reform: sale of non-performing assets, corporate restructuring to 
provide proper incentives and controls, and a reduction in corporate debt. While some of 
these reforms are taking place, they must be done aggressively and boldly to preserve the 
long-term viability of Daewoo. 
University of Michigan Business School 13 
Daewoo Motor Company 
EXHIBITS 
University of Michigan Business School 14 
Daewoo Motor Company 
University of Michigan Business School 15 
University of Michigan Business School 16 
University of Michigan Business School 
17 
University of Michigan Business School 
18 
